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COOPERATION—WHAT IS IT AND WHY DO IT? 
By David J. Waxse* 
 
Cite as: David J. Waxse, Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, XVIII 
RICH. J. L. & TECH. 8 (2012), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v18i3/article8.pdf. 
 
 
[1]  Litigation is a method of resolving disputes that is too costly and 
time consuming for most parties involved.  As a Federal Magistrate Judge 
involved in case management on a day-to-day basis, I often see evidence 
of this.  I also participated in the 2010 Conference on Civil Litigation held 
at Duke Law School1 and sponsored by the Federal Judicial Conference 
Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure.2  The conference 
explored “the current costs of civil litigation in Federal Court, particularly 
discovery, and discuss[ed] possible solutions.”3  As part of the conference, 
the Federal Judicial Center presented its research findings on its study of 
the costs of litigation in federal court.4  Further, all of the papers submitted 
                                                            
* David J. Waxse is a United States Magistrate Judge in the District of Kansas.  The 
author thanks Ken Withers, Director of Judicial Education for The Sedona Conference®, 
for his insight and support, as well as my wife, Judy Pfannenstiel, and my law clerk 
Brenda Yoakum-Kriz, for their assistance with editing and revising this article.  The 
views expressed in this article are those of the author alone and not the United States 
District Court for the District of Kansas. 
 
1 See Conference Panelists, 2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., 4 (May 10-11, 2010), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Pa
nelists.pdf. 
 
2 2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulem 
aking/Overview/DukeWebsite Msg.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2011). 
 
3 Id. 
 
4 See JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON 
THE 2010 CONF. ON CIVIL LITIG. (May 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/us 
courts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Report%20to 
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to the conference are available on the U.S. Courts’ website for the 
conference.5 
 
[2]  Many articles and reports have been written about the conference, 
but in my view there was a clear consensus among the participants that 
civil litigation takes too long and costs too much.  The ultimate purpose of 
the conference was to try to find ways to effectuate the purposes of the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure—“to secure the just, speedy, and 
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding.”6  As the 
Report to the Chief Justice of the United States on the conference 
indicates, participants provided many specific and general suggestions for 
changes in both rules and litigation practices.7 
 
[3] Although there were suggestions for changes in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure, the participants were unable to reach any clear 
consensus on any specific changes.8  Among the other areas the 
participants discussed were increased judicial involvement in case 
management and the use of sanctions for improper behavior.9  The 
suggestion I made, along with many other participants, was to encourage 
cooperation in the discovery process, a suggestion that became a 
consensus recommendation.10 
                                                                                                                                                    
%20the%20Chief%20Justice.pdf (reporting on the overall purpose of the conference as 
well as the schedule). 
 
5 See 2010 CIVIL LITIG. CONF., supra note 2 (click on “Papers Submitted by Conference 
Panelists”). 
 
6 Id. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
 
7 See generally JUDICIAL CONF. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES 
OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 4. 
 
8 See id. at 12 (highlighting “two particular areas that merit the Rules Committees' 
prompt attention,” rather than recommending specific changes).  
 
9 See id. at 8-10. 
 
10 See id. at 10.  
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[4]  What is cooperation and why will it work as a solution to the 
problems of increased costs and delay in litigation?  According to the 
Merriam-Webster Dictionary, cooperation is “the action of cooperating” 
and cooperating is “to act or work with another . . . for mutual benefit.”11 
 
[5]  Before I talk about cooperation in the litigation context, I want to 
explore what scientific research has shown on why humans cooperate.  
Although lawyers and judges do not need to fully understand the science 
on why humans cooperate, I think it is helpful to understand that there are 
scientific grounds for why cooperation occurs.  For example, Russell 
Hardin, in a portion of the abstract to his article “The Genetics of 
Cooperation,” says: 
 
Much of the literature . . . supposes that we must explain 
directly the cooperative tendency, whether by individual or 
group selection.  A more effective way to go is to find 
something more general and likely more deeply embedded 
in personal traits that enables and even enhances 
cooperation.  [Several scholars], long ago proposed a 
psychological phenomenon now called mirroring, which 
induces good relations through shared sentiments in a way 
that is essentially hard-wired.  Mirroring indirectly 
contributes to cooperativeness.  There may be other 
similarly indirect ways to account for human 
cooperativeness.12 
 
James H. Fowler, Laura A. Baker, and Christopher T. Dawes, in their 
paper titled “The Genetic Basics of Political Cooperation,” say in the 
abstract: “Cooperation has been a focus of intense interest in the biological 
                                                            
11 Cooperation, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/c 
ooperation (last visited Feb. 13, 2012); Cooperating, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cooperate (last visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 
12 Russell Hardin, The Genetics of Cooperation, 28 ANALYSE & KRITIK 57, 57 (2006), 
available at www.analyse-und-kritik.net/2006-1/AK_Hardin_2006.pdf. 
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and social sciences. . . . These results suggest that humans exhibit genetic 
variation in their tendency to cooperate and that biological evolution has 
played an important role in the development of political cooperation.”13  
More recently in an October 2011 blog post in the “Anthropology in 
Practice,” section of Scientific American, Krystal D’Costa stated: 
 
Cooperation confounds us: Humans are the only members 
of the animal kingdom to display this tendency to the extent 
that we do, and it’s an expensive endeavor with no 
guarantee of reciprocal rewards.  While we continue to look 
for answers about how and why cooperation may have 
emerged in human social and cultural evolution, we are 
beginning to trace the developmental roots of prosocial 
behaviors.14 
 
[6]  There are also numerous references to cooperation in the 
interdisciplinary fields of systems analysis,15 social science research,16 and 
                                                            
13 James H. Fowler, Laura A. Baker & Christopher T. Dawes, The Genetic Basics of 
Political Cooperation, DIGITAL COMMONS@U. NEB. - LINCOLN, 1 (Oct. 9, 2006), 
available at http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context= 
politicalsciencehendricks. 
 
14 Krystal D’Costa, Cooperation Is Child’s Play, SCI. AM. (Oct. 10, 2011), 
http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/anthropology-inpractice/2011/10/10/cooperationnisc 
hilds-play.  But see Eric Michael Johnson, On the Origin of Cooperative Species: New 
Study Reverses a Decade of Research Claiming Chimpanzee Selfishness, THE PRIMATE 
DIARIES (Aug. 8, 2011), http://blogs.scientificamerican.com/primate-diaries/2011/08/08 
/origin-of-cooperative-species/ (“But a new study reveals for the first time that thinking 
of others unites humans and chimpanzees in a cooperative bond that reaches across two 
epochs to the very evolutionary ancestor Darwin predicted.”).  
 
15 See, e.g., Otto Pulkkinen, Emergence of Cooperation and Systems Intelligence, in 
SYSTEMS INTELLIGENCE AND LEADERSHIP IN EVERYDAY LIFE 251 (Raimo P. Hämäläinen 
& Esa Saarinen eds. 2007), available at http://www.sal.tkk.fi/publications/pdf-
files/rpul07.pdf. 
 
16 See, e.g., Ming Ming Chiu, Group Problem-Solving Processes: Social Interactions and 
Individual Actions, 30 J. THEORY SOC. BEHAV. 27, 36, available at http://gse.buffalo.edu 
/fas/chiu/pdf/Group_Problem_Solving_Processes.pdf. 
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brain research.17  In many of these fields researchers are using brain scans 
to track what causes humans to cooperate.18  Other clear messages from 
the research are that cooperation can be taught and that cultural 
mechanisms help develop cooperation.19 
 
[7]  That understanding helped in the development of The Sedona 
Conference®20 “Cooperation Proclamation”21 in 2009.  As of September 
2010, I, along with over 100 other judges, have endorsed the Cooperation 
Proclamation.22  The Cooperation Proclamation begins with this 
observation: 
 
The costs associated with adversarial conduct in pre-trial 
discovery have become a serious burden to the American 
judicial system.  This burden rises significantly in 
discovery of electronically stored information (“ESI”).  In 
addition to rising monetary costs, courts have seen 
escalating motion practice, overreaching, obstruction, and 
extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes—in some 
                                                            
17 See, e.g., Christie Nicholson, Brains Built to Cooperate, SCI. AM. (Nov. 6, 2011), 
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=brains-built-to-cooperate-11-
11-06. 
 
18 See, e.g., James K. Rilling et al., A Neural Basis for Social Cooperation, 35 NEURON 
395 (2002), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S08966 
27302007559. 
 
19 See id. at 403.  
 
20 Frequently Asked Questions, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, http://www.thesedonacon 
ference.org/ content/faq (last visited Feb. 6, 2012) (introducing The Sedona Conference® 
as a nonprofit, 501(c)(3) research and educational institute dedicated to the advanced 
study of law and policy in the areas of antitrust law, complex litigation, and intellectual 
property rights).  
 
21 See The Sedona Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation, 
10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331 (2009). 
 
22 Id. at 336. 
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cases precluding adjudication on the merits altogether—
when parties treat the discovery process in an adversarial 
manner [sic].  Neither law nor logic compels these 
outcomes.23  
 
[8]  The Cooperation Proclamation acknowledges that what is required 
is a “paradigm shift for the discovery process.”24  The Sedona 
Conference®, in the Proclamation, envisions a three-part process:  
 
(1) Awareness (the Proclamation itself);  
 
(2) Commitment (the writing of a Brandeis style brief “The Case 
for Cooperation” to develop a “detailed understanding and full 
articulation of the issues and changes needed to obtain 
cooperative fact-finding”); and  
 
(3) Tools (“[d]eveloping and distributing practical ’toolkits’ to 
train and support lawyers, judges, other professionals, and 
students in techniques of discovery cooperation, collaboration, 
and transparency.”).25  
 
As part of the effort to provide tools to promote cooperation, The Sedona 
Conference® created “Resources for the Judiciary”26 and “The Sedona 
Conference® Cooperation Guidance for Litigators & In-House 
Counsel.”27 
                                                            
23 Id. at 331.   
 
24 Id. at 332. 
 
25 Id. at 332-33. 
 
26 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION 
PROCLAMATION: RESOURCES FOR THE JUDICIARY 2 (2011), available at http://www 
.thesedonaconference.org/dltForm?did=Judicial_Resources.pdf. 
 
27 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION GUIDANCE 
FOR LITIGATORS & IN-HOUSE COUNSEL 1 (2011), available at http://www.thesedon 
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[9]  The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Guidance for Litigators & 
In-House Counsel discusses an issue often raised by lawyers when 
presented with the idea of cooperation: How does the idea of cooperation 
exist in an adversary system where each lawyer has a duty of zealous 
advocacy?28  Lawyers and judges should consider that the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct removed the former ethical obligation for 
zealous advocacy from the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility when the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
replaced the Code in 1983.29 
 
[10]  Prior to that, Canon 7 of the ABA Model Code of Professional 
Responsibility stated: “A Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously 
Within the Bounds of the Law.”30  Even in 1983, under Canon 7, Ethical 
Consideration [EC 7-39] discussed cooperation.31  It stated: 
 
In the final analysis, proper functioning of the adversary 
system depends upon cooperation between lawyers and 
tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve the 
impartiality of tribunals and make their decisional 
processes prompt and just, without impinging upon the 
                                                                                                                                                    
aconference.org/dltForm?did=Cooperation_Guidance_for_Litigators_and_In_House_Co
unsel.pdf. 
 
28 See id. at 2, 17. 
 
29 See Elizabeth Mary Kameen, Rethinking Zeal: Is It Zealous Representation or 
Zealotry?, 44 APR. MD. B.J. 4, 6 (2011) (“Thus in 1983, the Model Rules moved the 
discussion of zealous representation from the body of the Rules to the Preamble.”); see 
also Michael H. Rubin, The Ethical Utah Lawyer: What Are the Limits in Negotiation?, 
21 APR. UTAH B.J. 15, 15 (2008) (“In fact, ‘zealous advocacy’ has not been a 
requirement of national lawyers' codes since 1983 . . . .”). 
 
30 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1980). 
 
31 MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-39 (1980). 
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obligation of lawyers to represent their clients zealously 
within the framework of the law.32 
 
In the current version of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, this 
explicit obligation of zealous advocacy no longer exists.33  Zealous 
advocacy is mentioned only in the Preamble and in the comment to Rule 
1.3.34  The Preamble to the Model Rules provides an overview of the role 
of a lawyer.  More specifically it provides: 
[1] A lawyer, as a member of the legal profession, is a 
representative of clients, an officer of the legal system and 
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality 
of justice. 
[2] As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs 
various functions.  As advisor, a lawyer provides a client 
with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights 
and obligations and explains their practical implications.  
As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position 
under the rules of the adversary system.  As negotiator, a 
lawyer seeks a result advantageous to the client but 
consistent with requirements of honest dealings with others.  
As an evaluator, a lawyer acts by examining a client's legal 
affairs and reporting about them to the client or to others.35 
  
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.3 states, “A lawyer shall act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”36  The 
                                                            
32 Id. 
 
33 See Rubin, supra note 29, at 15.  
 
34 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. (2006); MODEL RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT PREAMBLE (2006). 
 
35 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble (2006).  
 
36 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 (2006).  
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comment to this rule mentions zealous advocacy.  It provides as follows: 
“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests 
of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.  A lawyer 
is not bound, however, to press for every advantage that might be realized 
for a client.”37 
 
[11]  The Model Rules make clear that this discussion of zealous 
advocacy in the Preamble and in a comment do not create an ethical 
obligation of zealous advocacy.38  More explicitly, the last paragraph of 
the Scope of the Model Rules states: “The Comment accompanying each 
Rule explains and illustrates the meaning and purpose of the Rule.  The 
Preamble and this note on Scope provide general orientation.  The 
Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each 
Rule is authoritative.”39 
 
[12]  With that knowledge of the history of the no longer existing ethical 
obligation of zealous advocacy, the Sedona Conference® provides the 
following response in its Guidance for Litigators & In-House Counsel: 
 
Litigators are, of course, expected and ethically required to 
be advocates for their clients.  They are also expected and 
ethically required to conduct discovery in a diligent, 
efficient, and candid manner.  The tone of a case is usually 
set at the beginning, so it is important for all counsel to 
abide by and advance the principles of cooperative 
discovery at the outset of the case.40 
 
                                                            
37 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt (2006).  
 
38 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (2006). 
 
39 Id.   
 
40 THE SEDONA CONFERENCE® COOPERATION GUIDANCE FOR LITIGATORS & IN-HOUSE 
COUNSEL, supra note 27, at 2. 
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[13]  The Guidance identifies opportunities for constructive, mutually 
beneficial cooperation with opposing counsel, and provides pointers on 
how to take advantage of such opportunities.41    
 
[14]  Following the creation of the Cooperation Proclamation, many 
courts have now written opinions urging counsel to be cooperative.42  For 
example, Judge Paul Grimm, in Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Services 
Company, wrote: 
 
Although judges, scholars, commentators and lawyers 
themselves long have recognized the problems associated 
with abusive discovery, what has been missing is a 
thoughtful means to engage all the stakeholders in the 
litigation process—lawyers, judges and the public at 
large—and provide them with the encouragement, means 
and incentive to approach discovery in a different way.  
The Sedona Conference, a non-profit, educational research 
institute best known for its Best Practices 
Recommendations and Principles for Addressing 
Electronic Document Production, recently issued a 
Cooperation Proclamation to announce the launching of “a 
national drive to promote open and forthright information 
sharing, dialogue (internal and external), training, and the 
development of practical tools to facilitate cooperative, 
collaborative, transparent discovery.” . . .  In the meantime, 
however, the present dispute evidences the need for clearer 
guidance how to comply with the requirements of Rules 
26(b)(2)(C) and 26(g) in order to ensure that the Plaintiffs 
obtain appropriate discovery to support their claims, and 
the Defendants are not unduly burdened by discovery 
                                                            
41 See id. at 3. 
 
42 See, e.g., Gipson v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
103822 (D. Kan. Dec. 23, 2008); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 
354 (D. Md. 2008).  
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demands that are disproportionate to the issues in this 
case.43 
 
In one of my opinions, Gipson v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, I 
stated: 
 
As of the date of the discovery conference, more than 115 
motions and 462 docket entries had been filed in this case, 
even though the case has been on file for less than a year.  
Many of the motions filed have addressed matters that the 
Court would have expected the parties to be able to resolve 
without judicial involvement.  
  
This Court’s goal, in accordance with Rule 1 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, is to administer the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in a “just, speedy and inexpensive” 
manner.  To assist the Court in accomplishing this goal, the 
parties are encouraged to resolve discovery and other 
pretrial issues without the Court's involvement.  To help the 
parties and counsel understand their discovery obligations, 
counsel are directed to read the Sedona Conference 
Cooperation Proclamation, which this Court has previously 
endorsed.44  
 
[15]  There are now numerous opinions making the same point about 
cooperation, yet it appears that cooperation is not being used enough as a 
method of obtaining the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of” 
                                                            
43 Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 363 (footnote call numbers omitted) (quoting The Sedona 
Conference®, The Sedona Conference® Cooperation Proclamation, supra note 21, at 
331) (citing THE SEDONA CONFERENCE®, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES 
RECOMMENDATIONS & PRINCIPLES FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT 
PRODUCTION (2004), available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/m 
iscFiles/SedonaPrinciples 200401.pdf). 
 
44 Gipson, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103822, at *4 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1). 
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the action.45  Why is cooperation not happening often enough and what 
can be done to increase cooperation in litigation?  
 
[16]  There are numerous reasons why cooperation is often not 
happening.  One is the misconception I have already discussed—that 
lawyers have an ethical obligation of zealous advocacy in every aspect of 
litigation.  Another reason is that lawyers who become litigators often 
have personalities that love conflict and competition.  They do not enjoy 
cooperation as much as they enjoy conflict.  Some lawyers may also be 
operating under the impression that their clients are impressed by shows of 
aggression.  In addition, combative pretrial behavior may be an attempt to 
avoid or postpone something that some lawyers fear, and that is an actual 
trial on the merits.  
 
[17]  Another reason that is not openly discussed often is that the hourly 
billing system used by many law firms is an incentive to engage in conflict 
instead of cooperation.46  It takes more time to fight over everything than 
it takes to cooperate.  Thus, when the lawyer is paid based solely on how 
much time they spend working, there is a disincentive to cooperate and 
therefore a potential conflict with the client’s interest in resolving the 
litigation in a cost effective manner. 
 
[18]  So, what can the courts and the profession do to increase 
cooperation in litigation?  Judges and lawyers have to take the position 
that the goal of litigation is the “just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination” of the matter as Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure already makes clear.47  
 
                                                            
45 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  
 
46 See David J. Waxse, Ethical Implications of Hourly Billing, 67 DEC. J. KAN. B. ASS’N 
2, 2 (1998). 
 
47 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
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[19]  To reach that goal, lawyers need to follow, and judges need to 
require compliance with, several other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
that imply cooperation but are not used enough to promote cooperation.  
For example, Fed. R. Civ. P. 16 provides that the Court may enter orders 
for the following purposes:  
 
Rule 16.  Pretrial Conferences; Scheduling; Management 
(a) Purposes of a Pretrial Conference.  In any action, the 
court may order the attorneys and any unrepresented parties 
to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such 
purposes as: 
(1) expediting disposition of the action; 
(2) establishing early and continuing control so that 
the case will not be protracted because of lack of 
management; 
(3) discouraging wasteful pretrial activities;  
(4) improving the quality of the trial through more 
thorough preparation; and  
(5) facilitating settlement.48  
 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) requires that the court limit discovery in 
certain instances.49  Cooperative lawyers would do this on their own.  For 
those who are not cooperating, this rule provides the following: 
 
When Required.  On motion or on its own, the court must 
limit the frequency or extent of discovery otherwise 
allowed by these rules or by local rule if it determines that:  
(i) the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative 
or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source 
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less 
expensive;  
                                                            
48 FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (emphasis added). 
 
49 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C). 
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(ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample 
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the 
action; or 
(iii) the burden or expense of the proposed 
discovery outweighs its likely benefit, considering the 
needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' 
resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the 
action, and the importance of the discovery in resolving the 
issues.50  
 
[20]   Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f) is another rule that promotes cooperation by 
setting out the parties’ planning conference duties.51  Parties must consider 
“the nature and basis of their claims and defenses and the possibilities for 
promptly settling or resolving the case; make or arrange for the disclosures 
required by Rule 26(a)(1); discuss any issues about preserving 
discoverable information; and develop a proposed discovery plan.”52  The 
Rule also establishes that “[t]he attorneys of record and all unrepresented 
parties that have appeared in the case are jointly responsible for arranging 
the conference, for attempting in good faith to agree on the proposed 
discovery plan, and for submitting to the court . . . a written report 
outlining the plan.”53 
 
[21]  Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) allows the court to insure that lawyers are not 
being uncooperative by making improper discovery requests and 
responses.54  The Rule provides: 
                                                            
50 Id. 
 
51 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f). 
 
52 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2). 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 See, e.g., Mezu v. Morgan St. Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 585—86 (D. Md. 2010) (ordering 
counsel to submit written verification that they carefully read Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 26, stating that “the ‘spirit and purposes’ of these discovery rules requires 
cooperation by counsel to identify and fulfill legitimate discovery needs, yet avoid 
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 (1) Signature Required; Effect of Signature.  Every 
disclosure under Rule 26(a)(1) or (a)(3) and every 
discovery request, response, or objection must be signed by 
at least one attorney of record in the attorney's own name . . 
. . By signing, an attorney or party certifies that to the best 
of the person's knowledge, information, and belief formed 
after a reasonable inquiry:  
(A) with respect to a disclosure, it is complete and 
correct as of the time it is made; and  
(B) with respect to a discovery request, response, or 
objection, it is:  
(i) consistent with these rules and warranted 
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for 
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law, or 
for establishing new law;  
(ii) not interposed for any improper purpose, 
such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or 
needlessly increase the cost of litigation; and  
(iii) neither unreasonable nor unduly 
burdensome or expensive, considering the needs of 
the case, prior discovery in the case, the amount in 
controversy, and the importance of the issues at 
stake in the action.55 
  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(3) provides courts with an enforcement tool.56  It 
states: 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
seeking discovery the cost and burden of which is disproportionally large to what is at 
stake” (quoting Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 357-58 (D. 
Md. 2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g). 
 
55 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1). 
 
56 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3); Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 357 (discussing the court’s ability 
to impose “an appropriate sanction” for a discovery violation). 
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If a certification violates this rule without substantial 
justification, the court, on motion or on its own, must 
impose an appropriate sanction on the signer, the party on 
whose behalf the signer was acting, or both.  The sanction 
may include an order to pay the reasonable expenses, 
including attorney's fees, caused by the violation.57  
 
[22]  In addition to the Rules of Civil Procedure, Congress arms courts 
with a statutory provision designed to enforce cooperation.58  28 U.S.C. § 
1927 states: 
 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in 
any court of the United States or any Territory thereof who 
so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 
personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees 
reasonably incurred because of such conduct.59 
 
[23]  Provided that counsel actually use and understand the Rules and 
the enforcement statute, they provide a clear path to cooperation.60  They 
also provide judges with sufficient tools to insure that counsel are focused 
on the goals enumerated in Rule of Civil Procedure 1, and that they use 
                                                            
57 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3). 
 
58 See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2006); Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to 
“Frivolous” Litigation: A Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions 
Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067, 1073-74 (1994) (noting that through § 1927, courts 
may impose such sanctions “[u]nder their inherent judicial power”). 
 
59 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
 
60 See Mezu v. Morgan St. Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 585-86 (D. Md. 2010) (lamenting 
counsel’s “deficient knowledge of fundamental rules of procedure, local rules, discovery 
guidelines, and decisional authority which, collectively unambiguously establish the 
Court’s expectation about how discovery is to be conducted to achieve the aspirations of 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 1”). 
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cooperation to reach those goals.61  If counsel understand that courts 
expect their cooperation, it is more likely to occur.  This is also another 
consensus from the Duke Conference.62  Lawyers are more cooperative 
when they know that the judge is watching (providing “adult supervision”) 
and enforcing cooperation responsibilities.63 
 
[24]  Finally, it may be helpful for a few lawyers to remind them that 
cooperation is something they should have learned in school.  Some, who 
cannot seem to learn to cooperate, might benefit from this list for 
elementary school teachers, explaining how to be a cooperative person:  
 
LISTEN carefully to others and be sure you understand 
what they are saying. 
SHARE when you have something that others would like to 
have. 
TAKE TURNS when there is something that nobody wants 
to do, or when more than one person wants to do the same 
thing. 
COMPROMISE when you have a serious conflict. 
DO YOUR PART the very best that you possibly can.  This 
will inspire others to do the same. 
SHOW APPRECIATION to people for what they 
contribute. 
ENCOURAGE PEOPLE to do their best. 
                                                            
61 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also id. 
 
62 See Mary Mack, Duke Conference on Civil Procedure and eDiscovery- Day 2, 
DISCOVERY RESOURCES (May 11, 2010), http://www.discoveryresources.org/library/case-
law-and-rules/duke-conference-on-civil-procedure-and-ediscovery-day-2/ (stating that 
there was a consensus at the conference that it was necessary to educate the bar on 
procedural e-discovery issues and expectations). 
 
63 See Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 669, 734-37 (2010) (noting the inevitable “struggle to control costs if lawyers 
continue to act like spoiled children”). 
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MAKE PEOPLE FEEL NEEDED.  Working together is a 
lot more fun that way. 
DON'T ISOLATE OR EXCLUDE ANYONE.  Everybody 
has something valuable to offer, and nobody likes being left 
out.64 
 
It is never too late to learn how to be cooperativeeven for litigators in 
federal court.  Both judges and lawyers must stay focused on securing “the 
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and 
proceeding,”65 and cooperation is the best way to reach that goal.  
                                                            
64 How to Be a Cooperative Person, Teaching Guide: COOPERATION for Grades K-5, 
GOODCHARACTER.COM, http://www.goodcharacter.com/YCC/Cooperation.html (last 
visited Feb. 6, 2012). 
 
65 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. 
